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The Independent Special
Prosecutor Case
By Professor Arnold Rochvarg

In its June 1988 decision, Morrison v.
Olson,1 the United States Supreme Court
decided the most politically significant
case since United States v. Nixon. 2 In Morri·
son v. Olson, the Court by a lopsided 7-1
vote 3 rejected the view that the independent special prosecutor established by the
Ethics in Government Act of 1978 4
("Ethics Act") is an unconstitutional
infringement upon the office of the President. By rejecting the arguments of the
Reagan administration and the various
targets of criminal investigations, the
Court affirmed Congress' ability to control any possible criminal behavior within
the executive branch.
The Ethics Act was a result of the Watergate experience, especially the dismissal of
Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox. The
powers of the Watergate Special Prosecutor, however, were created by a Justice
Department regulation. 5 This regulation
was subject to revocation by the Attorney
General either on his own initiative or in
response to presidential directive. 6 The
Ethics Act was enacted to remove from
the Attorney General and the President
the plenary authority over the special
prosecutor, and thus make the special
prosecutor independent.
The Ethics Act only applies to the
criminal investigation and prosecution of
certain officials within the executive
branch, e.g., the President, Vice President,
cabinet members, and certain officials of
the CIA, Justice Department, and Office
of the President, and some campaign officials of the President's campaign committee/ The Ethics Act is premised on the
belief that investigation of these officials
by the Justice Department, which is under
the President's direct control, creates an
intolerable conflict of interest. S
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Although the Ethics Act removes the
investigation and prosecution of certain
cases from the Justice Department, the
Attorney General does have a pivotal role
under the Ethics Act. If the Attorney General is provided with information "sufficient to constitute grounds to investigate,"
the Attorney General is required to begin
an investigation.9 If the Attorney General
determines that there are no reasonable
grounds for further investigation, the matter ends there. lo On the other hand, if the
Attorney General finds reasonable
grounds to believe further investigation is
warranted, he is required to refer the matter to a speCal judicial panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit. The special judicial
panel is then required to appoint someone
as the independent special prosecutor. This
panel also defines the jurisdiction of the
independent special prosecutor. II
The independent special prosecutor
. remains in office until the investigation
and any prosecution are complete. Until
such time, the independent special prosecutor can only be removed for good
cause. 12 This good cause determination is
made by the Attorney General.
The Ethics Act has been called into play
on various occasions during both the
Carter and Reagan administrations. At
times, the matter ended with the Attorney
General and no special prosecutor was
selected. At other times, however, special
prosecutors have been appointed, and have
obtained convictions. The most famous
investigation under the Ethics Act
involves the Iran-Contra affair. The controversy in Morrison v. Olson, however,
concerned the involvement of Justice
Department officials in a dispute over the
Environmental Protection Agency's re-

fusal to grant Congress access to documents pertaining to clean up of hazardous
waste sites.
In Morrison, there was a two-fold argument against the validity of the Ethics Act.
First, it was argued that the manner in
which the Act provides for the appointment and removal of the independent special prosecutor was unconstitutional.
Second, it was argued that the Ethics Act
violated the separation of powers doctrine
in that it impermissibly interfered with the
President's constitutional duty to take care
that the laws be faithfully executed.
Appointment
The first argument was that the unique
appointment process involving the Attorney General and the special judicial panel
violates the Appointments Clause of the
United States Constitution in Art. II, § 2,
cl.2. This clause requires all "principal"
officers of the federal government to be
nominated by the President and confirmed
by the Senate, but permits "inferior" officers to be appointed without Senate consent by "the President, the Courts, or the
Heads of Departments."13 The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia had
ruled that the independent special prosecutor was a principal officer whose appointment violates the Appointments Clause. 14
The court of appeals reasoned that the
independent special prosecutor is a principal officer because her power to investigate
and prosecute was "unchecked" bY:7 the
President}S The Supreme Court, however,
held that the independent special prosecutor "clearly falls"16 within the category of
inferior officers. Although the Court did
not draw any exact lines between principal
and inferior officers,17 the Court viewed
the independent special prosecutor as infe-
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rior because she is subject to removal by
the Attorney General, has no power to
formulate policy, and has a limited jurisdiction and tenure fixed by the special judicial panel.!8
The next issue that needed to be resolved
under the Appointments Clause was
whether an inferior officer of one branch
can be appointed by officials of another
branch. The challengers of the Ethics Act
argued that the Appointments Clause only
permits inferior officers to be appointed
by superiors in the same branch and, therefore, the selection of an executive official
by a judicial panel is improper. The
Supreme Court, howeyer, held that Congress can grant to one branch the power to
appoint inferior officers of another
branch. The Ethics Act therefore did not
violate the Appointments Clause.!9
The Supreme Court's analysis of the
Appointments Clause is significant for two
reasons. First, in over two hundred years
of constitutional history, this is the first
case where the Court "closely" construed
the clause. 2o Secondly, by giving Congress
the power to provide for inter-branch
appointments, the Court gave Congress a
potentially powerful tool in its power
struggle with the executive branch. The
Court did recognize that Congress' power
to provide for inter-branch appointments
was "not unlimited" if such an appointment would create an "incongruity"2!
(e.g., if Congress gave a court the power to
appoint the Secretary of Agriculture).22
Still, Congress' power to create executive
officials not appointed by the executive
branch could become a significant method
of exerting influence over the executive
branch.
Removal
The Ethics Act provides that the independent special prosecutor can be removed
from office only for good cause. 23 It was
argued that this good cause requirement
unconstitutionally infringed upon the
President's power to carry out his executive functions. This argument was based
on Myers v. United St4tesH in which the
Supreme Court in 1926 held that Senate
approval for the removal of a postmaster
improperly infringed upon the President's
duty to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed. One explanation of this case,
suggested by the Supreme Court in its
1935 Humphrey's Executoy25 opinion which
upheld a good cause limitation for removal
of a Federal Trade Commissioner, was that
the President's discretion to remove
"purely executive" officials could not be
limited by Congress. In Morrison v. Olson,
however, the Supreme Court backed away
from this explanation, and wrote that" our

present considered view"26 is that the constitutionality of any limitation on the Preside nt's ability to remove government officials is not whether they are purely
executive, but whether the removal restriction impedes the President's ability to perform his constitutional duties. 27 Here,
although the independent special prosecutor is clearly executive, the Court ruled
that because the independent special prosecutor has no policy making functions and
has limited jurisdiction, the good cause
restriction on removal does not "unduly
trammel" on the President's authority.28
The Court's holding that any executive
official's removal can be restricted by Congress as long as the President still is able to
accomplish his constitutional duties is
another victory for Congress in its power
struggle with the executive branch. Moreover, as with the Appointments Clause analysis, because the Court's decision offers no
bright lines, uncertainty as to which executive officers can be removed only for specified cause can result in additional tensions
between the two branches.

CCseparation of
powers . ... is a
system of checks and
balances. "
Separation of Powers
In general, the separation of powers doctrine is violated when one branch interferes
with
another
branch's
constitutionally assigned functions. 29 The
court of appeals had ruled that the Ethics
Act was unconstitutional because it interfered with the executive branch's obligation to execute the criminal laws. This was
true because the Ethics Act gave the power
of criminal prosecution to someone not
accountable to the President, and gave an
Article III court the power to appoint and
define the jurisdiction of an executive officer.30
The Supreme Court did not agree that
the Ethics Act violated the separation of
powers doctrine. The Court downplayed
the role of the special judicial panel
concluding that, because the judicial panel
can appoint an independent special prosecutor only if the Attorney General authorizes the appointment, there is no judicial
usurpation of executive functions. The
Court found the judicial panel's other

functions under the Ethics Act to be sufficiently limited. Although the power of the
judicial panel to terminate the independent
special prosecutor's tenure was "more
doubtful,"3! the Court narrowly interpreted this power to mean that the special
judicial panel could only terminate the
independent special prosecutor if the
investigation had been completed. By narrowly interpreting this power, the Court
concluded that there was not significant
judicial involvement in executive branch
functions. 32 The Court also pointed out
that unlike other instances where there
was a separation of powers violation,33
there was no attempt in the Ethics Act by
Congress to usurp any executive power.
The Attorney General's critical role in the
Ethics Act also illustrates that the executive branch retains control over the
criminal prosecution function.
The Court's analysis in Morrison of the
separation of powers issue is a clear rejection of a strict interpretation of the separation of powers doctrine. The Court
adopted a flexible approach which accepts
the view that separation of powers under
the federal constitution is not one of the
separation and isolation of each branch,
but rather a system of checks and balances. 34 The goal is not to avoid blending
powers within one branch, but rather to
avoid the submission of one branch to
another. Only the sole dissenter, Justice
Scalia, believed that the Constitution
requires that all executive power belongs
to the President, and that any sharing is
improper.35 The other justices, however,
adopted a balancing test which permits
some exercise of executive functions outside the executive branch. Although
Justice Scalia calls this "totality of the circumstances approach," a "revolution in
our constitutional jurisprudence,"36 it·
seems consistent with other Supreme
Court decisions such as CITe v. Schor37
which upheld the power of an independent agency to decide state law counterclaims as part of an agency adjudicatory
proceeding. Schor rejected the argument
that such authority could not be vested
outside an Article III court. Morrison is
also consistent with Humphrey's Executor38
which implicitly upholds the power of the
Federal Trade Commission, another independent agency, to exercise executive, legislative, and judicial functions. Recent
arguments that independent agencies are
unconstitutional 39 because of their blending of powers or because of their independence from presidential control should
surely be rejected in light of Morrison.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court rejected the Reagan
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administration's position that the independent special prosecutor unconstitutionally infringes upon presidential power.
The Supreme Court thus affirmed Congress' power to control criminal activity
within the executive branch. If Congress
will attempt to extend the reasoning of
Morrison v. Olson to further limit executive power, this will lead to further battles
between the legislative and executive
branches.
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